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In his important article, When Erie Goes International, Professor 
Childress addresses the marvelous question of the Erie doctrine’s 
application in an international context.
1
 In particular, Childress argues that 
Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co.,
2
 which held that a 
federal court sitting in diversity (or alienage) must borrow the choice-of-law 
rules of the state where the federal court is located, should not apply when 
the federal court chooses between state law and the law of a foreign nation.
3
 
In this Essay, I have three points to make in response—one clarificatory and 
two critical.  
The clarificatory point is that even if Childress is correct, the bulk of 
the Erie doctrine applies unchanged in international cases. Childress’s 
arguments are directed solely to Klaxon and international choice of law. 
The first critical point concerns the merits of Childress’s arguments, all but 
one of which give us no reason to think that Klaxon should be abandoned in 
international cases. The one argument that has any success is that a federal 
court’s choice between state and foreign law implicates federal interests in 
foreign relations, in particular comity with the foreign nation. These federal 
interests can indeed override Klaxon’s command. But this brings me to my 
second critical point: Childress exaggerates the extent to which these 
federal interests will displace Klaxon. Whereas he thinks that federal law 
will preempt much—or perhaps all—state law on international choice of 
law, I argue that preemption will be rare. 
I. MOST OF ERIE STILL APPLIES IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
EVEN IF CHILDRESS’S ARGUMENTS SUCCEED 
Even if the arguments in Childress’s article succeed, their effect is 
relatively narrow. Most of the Erie doctrine still applies in an international 
context. To see why, consider an international Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins.
4
 In the original Erie, Tompkins, a Pennsylvania domiciliary, was 
struck by something protruding from one of Erie’s trains—probably an 
open door—while trespassing on Erie’s property in Pennsylvania. He sued 
 
* Dudley W. Woodbridge Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1 Donald Earl Childress III, When Erie Goes International, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1531 (2011) (link). 
2 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (link). 
3 Childress, supra note 1, at 1577–78. 
4 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (link). 
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Erie, a domiciliary of New York, in federal court in New York.5 For our 
international Erie case, imagine that the accident had happened in Ontario, 
Canada or that Tompkins or Erie (or both) had been a domiciliary of 
Ontario when the accident in Pennsylvania occurred.
6
 
Erie stands, in part, for the principle that diversity jurisdiction does not 
give a federal court the power to make federal common law that displaces 
the state-law right upon which the plaintiff sues.
7
 The scope of federal 
courts’ power to make common law is a contested matter,
8
 but at the very 
least it requires the presence of some federal regulatory interest, not just 
jurisdiction.
9
 Childress concedes that this core constitutional principle of 
Erie applies in international cases. He does not suggest that the federal 
court entertaining our international Erie case would have the power to make 
a federal common law rule governing Erie’s duty of care to Tompkins 
merely because one or both of the parties is a foreign domiciliary or 
because the event being litigated occurred abroad.
10
 His point is solely that 
federal law should govern the choice between state and foreign law. 
Erie also stands for a principle of interpretive fidelity. It was not 
enough that the federal court in Erie applied Pennsylvania law. It had to 





6 If Erie Railroad or Tompkins was a foreign domiciliary, the source of federal subject matter 
jurisdiction would be alienage rather than diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(2) (2006) (link). If both were a 
foreign domiciliary, there might be federal subject matter jurisdiction, provided it was joined to what 
was otherwise a diversity case, id. § 1332(a)(3), or to a federal question action in a manner that gave it 
supplemental jurisdiction, id. § 1367 (link). 
7 See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (stating that a 
principle of Erie is that the constitutional grant of diversity jurisdiction does not give federal courts the 
power to develop a “concomitant body of general federal law”) (link); see also Martha A. Field, Sources 
of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99 HARV. L. REV. 881, 915–23 (1986) (“[T]he firm 
holding of Erie is that the existence of diversity jurisdiction does not provide a basis for making federal 
common law.”); Michael Steven Green, Horizontal Erie and the Presumption of Forum Law, 109 MICH. 
L. REV. 1237, 1244 (2011) (“Under Erie, federal courts do not possess lawmaking power by virtue of 
having subject matter jurisdiction.”). In fact, this Erie principle applies beyond diversity (and alienage) 
jurisdiction to other circumstances in which a federal court can get jurisdiction over a state law action, 
such as supplemental jurisdiction or bankruptcy. See Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) 
(link); Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633, 663–78 
(2004).  
8 Compare Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 
(1985) (tying federal common lawmaking powers closely to the specific intentions of Congress), with 
Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 805 (1989) (finding power to create federal 
common law wherever there is a legitimate national governmental interest).  
9 E.g., Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988) (link). 
10 Childress, supra note 1, at 1568, 1577–78. 
11 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938). For a discussion of whether the constitutional duty 
to defer to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court concerning the content of Pennsylvania law would exist if 
that court did not want federal courts to give it deference, see Michael Steven Green, Erie’s Suppressed 
Premise, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1111 (2011) (link).  
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/17/ 167 
Furthermore, if Pennsylvania law was unsettled, in the sense that no 
relevant Pennsylvania Supreme Court decisions existed, it had to predict 
what the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision would be.
12
 Once again, 
Childress’s article does not cast doubt upon the applicability of this 
principle in international cases. If the court in our international Erie case 
applies Ontario law, it apparently has an obligation to defer to the decisions 
of the Court of Appeal for Ontario and, if the matter is unsettled, predict the 
Court of Appeal’s likely decision.
13
  
Under Erie, jurisdiction is insufficient to give federal courts the power 
to create federal common law that displaces the state-law right upon which 
the plaintiff sues. But that does not mean that federal courts sitting in 
diversity do not have the power to create procedural common law—that is, 
federal common law that regulates the means by which substantive rights 
are litigated in the federal court system.
14
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
has articulated another Erie principle restricting federal courts’ power in 
this area. When entertaining state law actions, they are constrained by the 
“twin aims of the Erie rule”: discouraging forum shopping between state 
and federal courts and avoiding the inequitable administration of the laws.
15
 
Unlike the first two Erie principles, which are generally understood as 
constitutionally compelled,
16




Because of the twin aims, federal courts entertaining state law actions 
 
12 Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 249 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (link); Comm’r 
v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (link). For a discussion of this obligation, see Bradford R. 
Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 
145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 1495–1517 (1997) (link); Green, supra note 7, at 1237–51. 
13 Let me be clear that I am not necessarily endorsing the view that these Erie principles apply in 
international cases. I have expressed doubt about whether a federal court applying the law of a foreign 
nation has the same duties of interpretive fidelity that Erie puts upon federal courts when interpreting 
state law. Green, supra note 7, at 1260–61 n.110. Furthermore, just what interpretive fidelity amounts to 
in connection with a foreign civil law jurisdiction is a difficult issue. Because the decisions by the 
highest court of appeals in such a jurisdiction are not binding upon lower courts in subsequent cases, it is 
not clear that the predictive method is appropriate. For an argument that federal courts should use the 
predictive method for Louisiana law, even though it is a civil law jurisdiction, see Green, supra note 11, 
at 1147 n.155. My current goal, however, is not to discuss whether Childress’s assumptions are correct 
but solely to identify the scope of his argument.  
14 Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 92 (Reed, J., concurring) (“The line between procedural and substantive law 
is hazy but no one doubts federal power over procedure.”); Amy Coney Barrett, Procedural Common 
Law, 94 VA. L. REV. 813, 846–78 (2008) (link).  
15 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 467–68 (1965) (link). For a discussion of the twin aims, see 
Michael Steven Green, In Defense of the Twin Aims of Erie, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. (forthcoming 
2013).  
16 See Green, supra note 7, at 1243–44. 
17 Childress agrees with the characterization of the twin aims as nonconstitutional in origin. 
Childress, supra note 1, at 1543. Most argue that the statutory source of the twin aims is the Rules of 
Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (link). E.g., John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 
87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 722–23 (1974). For an argument that the twin aims have their source not in the 
Rules of Decision Act but in the statute giving the federal court jurisdiction, see Green, supra note 15. 
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are often obligated to borrow procedural law from the courts of the forum 
state, since disuniformity would generate forum shopping and inequity. But 
the twin aims are not dispositive. Even if the difference between a federal 
common law procedural rule and the forum state’s law would frustrate the 
twin aims, the federal rule can still be used if there are “countervailing” 
federal interests in its favor.
18
  
Nothing in Childress’s article casts doubt upon the applicability of the 
twin aims to international cases. For example, he would surely agree that 
Guaranty Trust v. York remains unchanged.
19
 The federal court entertaining 
our international Erie case could not craft its own common law limit on the 
amount of time Tompkins could wait before suing Erie. The reason is 
simple: a federal time limit that differed from the forum state’s statute of 
limitations would result in forum shopping and inequity, and no 
countervailing federal interests in favor of a uniform federal limit exist.  
Childress’s assumption that the twin aims apply in international cases 
is evident in his discussion of forum non conveniens. Since federal forum 
non conveniens doctrine is judge-created, the twin aims limit federal courts’ 
ability to use it in diversity cases. “[I]t is arguable,” Childress observes, 
“that [forum non conveniens] doctrine should be governed by state law in 
federal diversity actions.”
20
 To be sure, federal courts addressing this 
question have generally held that federal standards should be used.
21
 But 
this is because countervailing federal interests have overcome the twin 
aims, not because the twin aims fail to apply at all.
22
 
That the twin aims apply in an international context is no small matter, 
for it means that countless procedural issues faced by federal courts in 
international cases will be governed by standards borrowed from the forum 
state. Some examples are: the tolling of statutes of limitations;
23
 
preconditions for bringing suit (such as posting a bond,
24
 filing a certificate 
of merit,
25









18 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 537 (1958) (link); see also Semtek Int’l Inc. 
v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508–09 (2001) (link); Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, 518 
U.S. 415, 431–32 (1996) (link). 
19 326 U.S. 99 (1945) (link). 
20 Childress, supra note 1, at 1564. 
21 Id.  
22 See, e.g., Esfeld v. Costa Crociere, S.P.A., 289 F.3d 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (link). 
23 See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 749 (1981) (link); Ragan v. Merchants Transfer 
& Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (link). 
24 See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (link). 
25 See Chamberlain v. Giampapa, 210 F.3d 154 (3d Cir. 2000) (link). 
26 See Edelson v. Soricelli, 610 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1979) (link); Stoner v. Presbyterian Univ. Hosp., 
609 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1979) (link).  
27 See Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir. 1979) (link). 
28 See Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Tolliver, 636 F.3d 1273 (10th Cir. 2011) (link). 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW COLLOQUY  
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/17/ 169 
for a settlement involving a minor;
29
 the validity of forum selection 
clauses,
30







 In none of these instances would Childress’s 
argument apply. His argument is solely that choice-of-law rules should not 
be borrowed from the forum state in international cases. 
Yet another Erie principle concerns the applicability of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure in diversity cases. Here the twin aims are irrelevant. The 
fact that the difference between the Federal Rule and forum state law results 
in forum shopping and inequity does not mean the Federal Rule cannot be 
applied. A Federal Rule’s validity depends solely upon two considerations: 
whether it is within Congress’s power to regulate the procedure of federal 
courts
34
 and whether it satisfies the limitations in the Rules Enabling 
Act
35
—in which Congress delegated its regulatory power to the Supreme 
Court.
36
 The most significant limitation in the Act is that a Federal Rule 
must not “abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.”
37
  
Professor Childress gives us no reason to think that the Rules Enabling 
Act’s substantive right limitation does not apply in an international context. 
The fact that a Federal Rule abridges, enlarges, or modifies a foreign 
substantive right would apparently be as problematic as the fact that it 
abridges, enlarges, or modifies a state (or federal) substantive right.
38
  
In the end, Childress’s argument is focused on only one aspect of the 
Erie doctrine: Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., which 
held that a federal court should borrow the choice-of-law rules of the state 
where the federal court is located.
39
 As Childress rightly notes, Klaxon was 
motivated by the twin aims.
40
 If federal courts came up with their own 
choice-of-law rules, the resulting disuniformity with the rules of the forum 
 
29 See Burke v. Smith, 252 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2001) (link). 
30 See Preferred Capital, Inc. v. Sarasota Kennel Club, Inc., 489 F.3d 303 (6th Cir. 2007) (link).  
31 See Mangold v. Cal. Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 67 F.3d 1470 (9th Cir. 1995) (link). 
32 See Vishipco Line v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 660 F.2d 854 (2d Cir. 1981) (link). 
33 See Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Walbrook Ins. Co., 41 F.3d 764 (1st Cir. 1994) (link). 
34 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965) (power extends to matters “rationally capable of 
classification” as substance or procedure). 
35 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (2006) (link). 
36 Hanna, 380 U.S. at 464, 469–74.  
37 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006) (link). For a recent discussion of the substantive right provision of the 
Act, see Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431, 1444 (2010) (Scalia, J.) 
(reading the provision as requiring only that the Federal Rule “really regulates procedure”) (link); id. at 
1452 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment) (arguing that the provision means that a Federal Rule 
“cannot govern a particular case in which the rule would displace a state law that is procedural in the 
ordinary use of the term but is so intertwined with a state right or remedy that it functions to define the 
scope of the state-created right”); id. at 1463 n.2 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (accepting Stevens’s reading). 
38 Once again, I am not necessarily endorsing this position. It is possible that the substantive rights 
provision of the Rules Enabling Act was not meant by Congress to apply to foreign rights.  
39 313 U.S. 487 (1941). 
40 Childress, supra note 1, at 1559.  
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state would generate both vertical forum shopping (between state and 
federal courts) and inequity.
41
 Childress argues, however, that when the 
choice is between state law and the law of a foreign nation, federal common 
law choice-of-law rules should be used. 
An example is Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,
42
 in which a 
federal court in New York had to determine whether the Cuban 
government’s expropriation of a U.S. company’s assets should be denied 
effect. Because the expropriation was valid under Cuban law, this was a 
choice-of-law issue—namely, whether Cuban or state (presumably New 
York) law ought to apply.
43
 Although it appeared that New York’s choice-
of-law rules would have chosen Cuban law anyway, the Supreme Court 
made it clear that the matter was governed by the federal act-of-state 
doctrine, which mandated the application of Cuban law. Klaxon was 
irrelevant. 
Notice that insofar as he uses Sabbatino as his model, Childress’s 
argument is not that federal choice-of-law rules should be used in federal 
court only. Rather, they should supplant state rules in both federal and state 
court,
44




II. ALL BUT ONE OF CHILDRESS’S ARGUMENTS FAIL TO MEET THEIR 
MARK 
Now for the first of two critical points: Professor Childress offers four 
main arguments in favor of federalizing international choice of law, but 
only one has any success.  
A. Horizontal Forum Shopping 
One of Childress’s unsuccessful arguments rests upon the entirely 
accurate observation that the difference in choice-of-law rules between the 
 
41 As Justice Reed put it, if federal courts had different choice-of-law rules from the forum state, “the 
accident of diversity of citizenship would constantly disturb equal administration of justice in coordinate 
state and federal courts sitting side by side.” Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496. 
42 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (link). 
43 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 307 F.2d 845, 854 (2d Cir. 1962) (link).  
44 Childress’s emphasis on Sabbatino suggests that the federal choice-of-law rules for international 
conflicts should be binding upon state courts. See, e.g., Childress, supra note 1, at 1567 (quoting 
favorably Louis Henkin’s statement that “[i]nternational conflicts, then, may raise federal questions on 
which states do not call the tune but must follow the federal lead”); id. at 1573 (stating that a 
“reconsideration of the Erie doctrine as applied in private international law cases is in order because 
where principles of international comity apply as a matter of federal law, they provide ‘a principle of 
decision binding on federal and state courts alike’” (quoting Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 427)). But at one 
point he hedges his bets, stating that “[f]ederal common law for conflicts cases could be developed as 
federal common law, which would be binding on the states like the act of state doctrine, or as procedural 
federal common law, which would not be binding on the states.” Id. at 1574 n.320.  
45 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 424–26; see Roxas v. Marcos, 969 P.2d 1209, 1249 (Haw. 1998) (link).  
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states generates horizontal forum shopping between courts in different 
states.
46
 Assume that a California plaintiff injured in Germany by a product 
made by a California company in California finds German rather than 
California law to his benefit. A court in California, using its comparative 
impairment approach to choice of law,
47
 would apply California law. But 
the plaintiff can still get German law by suing in Virginia, which uses the 
old-fashioned choice-of-law approach, exemplified in the First 
Restatement,
48
 under which the law of the place of the harm applies.
49
 
Childress argues that this horizontal forum shopping is a reason to 
question whether Klaxon should apply in international cases.
50
 Because 
Klaxon demands that federal courts use the forum state’s choice-of-law 
rules, it solves the problem of vertical forum shopping between federal and 
state courts only by encouraging horizontal forum shopping between federal 
courts. 
But horizontal forum shopping is not a reason to abandon Klaxon in 
international cases. Justice Reed was quite explicit in his opinion in Klaxon 
that horizontal forum shopping, no matter how prevalent, was not the 
Court’s concern: “Whatever lack of uniformity [the Klaxon rule] may 
produce between federal courts in different states is attributable to our 
federal system, which leaves to a state, within the limits permitted by the 
Constitution, the right to pursue local policies diverging from those of its 
neighbors.”
51
 Childress suggests that vertical forum shopping was 
emphasized in Klaxon only because the Court thought it was a more serious 
problem than the horizontal version,
52
 but Justice Reed’s opinion makes it 
clear that this is not the case. 
Furthermore, if discouraging horizontal forum shopping between 
federal courts was a concern, Klaxon would be undermined entirely, not just 
in cases involving international choice of law.
53
 Childress offers no 
evidence that horizontal forum shopping is more of a problem when the 
choice is between the laws of a state and a foreign nation than when it is 
between the laws of two states. He therefore gives us no reason to think that 




46 Childress, supra note 1, at 1560. 
47 See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 546 P.2d 719 (Cal. 1976) (link); Symeon C. Symeonides, Choice 
of Law in American Courts in 2008: Twenty-Second Annual Survey, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 269, 279 (2009) 
(link).  
48 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 379 (1934). 
49 Symeonides, supra note 47, at 279. 
50 Childress, supra note 1, at 1559–60. 
51 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941). 
52 Childress, supra note 1, at 1559. 
53 For criticisms of Klaxon for generating horizontal forum shopping, see, e.g., Patrick J. Borchers, 
The Real Risk of Forum Shopping: A Dissent from Shady Grove, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 32 (2010) 
(link); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum 
Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 38 (1986) (link). 
54 Childress argues that “[e]valuating whether these rationales are correct or even persuasive in the 
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In addition to being too comprehensive (because it applies beyond 
international cases), the argument from horizontal forum shopping is also 
too narrow, for it does not suggest that international choice of law be 
federalized in state court. Of course, we could imagine Childress insisting 
that horizontal forum shopping between state courts should also be 
discouraged. But I doubt that he wants to take such a stand, for the result 
would be that a whole host of procedural issues faced by state courts would 
be subject to uniform federal common law rules. Assume, for example, that 
a plaintiff chooses state court in Virginia rather than California because he 
likes Virginia’s longer statute of limitations. If avoiding such horizontal 
forum shopping were a reason to extend federal law to state courts, a 
uniform federal rule would preempt Virginia’s and California’s limitations 
periods. Childress cannot think that is right. 
B. The Rules of Decision Act 
The most intriguing of Childress’s arguments for federalizing choice of 
law in an international context relies upon the observation that the Rules of 




The laws of the several states, except where the 
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of 
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United 




The Act directs federal courts to apply the laws of the several states, 
not the laws of foreign nations. Childress argues that, to the extent that 
Klaxon has its source in the Act, it should not apply when a federal court is 
considering whether foreign law should be used.  
That the Rules of Decision Act does not refer to foreign law is a 
marvelous insight and potentially of great importance in understanding the 
Act’s purpose and scope. But it cannot justify an argument against Klaxon 
in international cases. As Childress himself concedes,
57
 Klaxon probably 
does not have its source in the Act.
58
 The Act ensures that federal courts 
 
domestic context is not my purpose here, for the federal courts do not question the continuing relevance 
of Erie [and Klaxon] to their domestic analyses.” Childress, supra note 1, at 1555. But federal courts do 
not question the continued relevance of Erie and Klaxon to their international analyses either. If 
Childress’s argument against Klaxon convinced federal courts in an international context, it should 
convince them in a domestic context as well.  
55 Id. at 1555–57. 
56 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (emphasis added) (link). 
57 Childress, supra note 1, at 1555. 
58 For an argument that the twin aims of Erie, and thus Klaxon, do not have their source in the Act, 
see Green, supra note 15. 
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respect their preexisting constitutional obligation to use applicable state 
law.
59
 For example, the Act compelled the federal court in Erie to apply 
Pennsylvania law concerning Erie’s duty of care to Tompkins, because 
Pennsylvania law applied to the case and was not preempted by any federal 
statute or common law rule.  
Klaxon therefore cannot have its source in the Act, for a forum state’s 
choice-of-law rules cannot apply—and do not purport to apply—to cases 
faced by federal courts. Assume that in our international Erie case New 
York choice-of-law rules would have selected Ontario rather than 
Pennsylvania law. New York surely does not have the power to compel a 
federal court in New York to choose Ontario law as well.
60 
Klaxon has its 
source in the twin aims and not in the Rules of Decision Act. Federal courts 
must borrow New York’s choice-of-law rules as a means of avoiding forum 
shopping and inequity. Thus, the fact that federal courts’ obligations under 
the Act do not extend to foreign law does not mean that the twin aims 
cannot obligate a federal court to apply foreign law if the courts of the 
forum state would do so.  
Furthermore, even if one sets this problem aside, the argument is too 
narrow; it addresses only federal courts’ obligations, since only their 
obligations are addressed by the Act. No interpretation of the Act’s scope 
can justify the displacement of state choice-of-law rules in state court. 
C. Forum Non Conveniens 
Childress’s third unsuccessful argument for federalizing choice of law 
in international cases is that using forum state choice-of-law rules 
improperly “thrusts federal courts into undertaking forum non conveniens 
analyses.”
61
 An important factor in favor of dismissal under forum non 
conveniens is that the court must apply foreign law, particularly when the 
content of that law is difficult or uncertain. Childress argues that, in the 
international context, Klaxon results in too many federal courts dismissing 
actions on forum non conveniens grounds because the forum state’s choice-
of-law rules require them to apply foreign law. These dismissals, Childress 
 
59 E.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., 483 U.S. 143, 162 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (“It directs federal courts to follow state laws only ‘in cases where they apply,’ which 
federal courts would be required to do even in the absence of the Act.”) (link). 
60 In saying that a state’s choice-of-law rules cannot extend to federal courts within its borders, I set 
aside the question of the extent to which a state’s choice-of-law rules might limit the territorial scope of 
the state’s own causes of action wherever they are brought. For example, New York choice-of-law rules 
might limit the territorial scope of New York causes of action when brought in federal or sister state 
court. For the view that choice-of-law rules can generate such limits, see Larry Kramer, Return of the 
Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1005–08 (1991); Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi: The 
Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1821, 1884 (2005) 
(link). For a criticism, see Green, supra note 11, at 1162–67; Michael Steven Green, Law’s Dark Matter, 
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (link).  
61 Childress, supra note 1, at 1561.  
107:165 (2013)  Erie’s International Effect 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2012/17/ 174 
argues, can frustrate federal interests.
62
 The problem is particularly acute for 
federal courts in states that accept the First Restatement, which can require 
that foreign law be used simply because a triggering event (such as the 
harm) occurred abroad, however minimal the foreign nation’s interests 
actually are. As a solution, Childress suggests a federal choice-of-law 




One virtue of this argument is that it can explain why federal choice-
of-law rules should apply in state as well as federal court. If state courts, 
relying on their own choice-of-law rules, continued to dismiss on forum 
non conveniens grounds, federal interests would still be frustrated.
64
  
But the argument is ultimately unsuccessful. Even if we assume that 
the excessive number of dismissals frustrates federal interests, it remains 
unclear why federalizing choice of law is the appropriate response. The 
problem, after all, is wrongful dismissal, not the application of foreign law. 
The most focused way of protecting federal interests, therefore, would be to 
create a federal common law rule that limits a court’s ability to dismiss on 
forum non conveniens grounds simply because foreign law applies. 
This proposed federal rule would be very limited in its effect. First of 
all, it would apply only when dismissal would frustrate federal interests. 
Second, even when this new rule does apply, it would not preempt state 
choice-of-law rules, but would simply demand that the court not dismiss the 
case on forum non conveniens grounds. If the court retained jurisdiction, 
federal interests would be satisfied even if it ended up applying foreign law. 
A court would have to change its choice-of-law approach only when it 
concluded that the burden of applying foreign law was too great to retain 
jurisdiction. Finally, the federal rule would impact all states’ choice-of-law 
approaches, not merely those that follow the First Restatement. This federal 
rule could just as easily force a court to give up its Second Restatement 
approach if that approach recommended foreign over state law. Nothing in 
Childress’s argument suggests that state choice-of-law rules should be 
preempted by a federal choice-of-law approach that is sensitive to state 
interests. 
 
62 Some examples are when the foreign court will also refuse to entertain the action or an American 
court must subsequently face the question of whether the foreign judgment should be enforced. Id. at 
1562–65. Although I question whether federal interests are commonly implicated in such cases, I will 
ignore the matter here. 
63 Id. at 1574–76. 
64 Childress offers another explanation of why courts are dismissing too often on forum non 
conveniens grounds: they take the mere possibility that foreign law applies as a reason to dismiss, 
without engaging in the choice-of-law analysis to determine whether the matter is really governed by 
foreign law. Id. at 1565–66. But this criticism of courts does nothing to support federalizing 
international choice of law. If courts are dismissing without engaging in the appropriate choice-of-law 
analysis, the problem cannot be solved by changing the analysis. Courts will dismiss too often whatever 
the choice-of-law rule is. 
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Occasionally Childress argues against Klaxon applying in international 
choice-of-law cases on the premise that “the application of foreign law, 
unlike sister-state law, is entirely voluntary.”
65
 This is puzzling. Childress 
cannot mean that an American court cannot be constitutionally obligated to 
apply foreign law. As he is clearly aware, a court can be required by due 
process to choose the law of a foreign nation over the law of a state.
66
 
Indeed, to the extent that a court faces a choice-of-law decision at all—even 
in an entirely domestic context—its choice to apply a particular 
jurisdiction’s law must be voluntary in the sense that it is constitutionally 
optional. For example, if a court uses its choice-of-law rules to determine 
whether it should apply California or Virginia law, it cannot be the case that 
it is constitutionally permitted to apply only one of those states’ laws. 
Although Childress’s point here is unclear, my guess is that by saying that 
the choice of foreign law is “voluntary,” he is arguing that the choice 
implicates federal concerns about comity and international relations. If so, it 
is connected to the argument I discuss in the next section. 
III. EVEN WHERE CHILDRESS’S ARGUMENTS SUCCEED, PREEMPTION 
OF STATE CHOICE-OF-LAW RULES BY FEDERAL COMMON LAW WILL BE 
RARE 
In the end, Childress’s best argument for federalizing international 
choice of law does not have to do with forum shopping, the Rules of 
Decision Act, or forum non conveniens. His best argument is this: unlike 
the choice between the laws of two states, the choice between state and 
foreign law can implicate federal interests in foreign relations, in particular 
comity with the foreign nation.
67
 As was the case in Sabbatino,
68
 these 
federal interests can justify uniform federal choice-of-law rules applicable 
in both federal and state courts.  
Although Childress is clearly right on this point, I think he exaggerates 
the extent to which displacement of state choice-of-law rules will occur. 
Whereas Childress thinks that federal law will preempt much—or perhaps 
all—state law on international choice of law, I doubt that preemption will 
extend much further than cases like Sabbatino. 
In general, a state’s choice-of-law rule will frustrate U.S. foreign 
relations only when it recommends state law over foreign law. After all, it 
is the refusal to apply foreign law that might offend the foreign nation, 




65 Id. at 1534; see also id. at 1556. 
66 Id. at 1549–54. 
67 Id. at 1573–74. 
68 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). 
69 Technically, these federal foreign relations interests are not confined to cases in which an 
American court chooses between foreign and state law. Cases in which the court chooses between the 
laws of two foreign nations are also a concern. Furthermore, federal interests might even arise in cases 
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was the case in Sabbatino, in which the federal act-of-state doctrine 
recommended that Cuban rather than New York law govern the dispute. 
The failure to apply Cuban law would have frustrated American foreign 
relations.
70
 To be sure, federal interests might occasionally recommend the 
application of state rather than foreign law. The failure of the foreign nation 
to respect American law in similar circumstances in the past might make it 
in the United States’ interest to retaliate by refusing to apply foreign law. 
To the extent that state choice-of-law rules recommend foreign law, they 
would be preempted by a uniform federal choice-of-law rule. But such 
situations would be unusual.  
It is odd, therefore, that Childress emphasizes as problematic those 
cases in which state choice-of-law rules choose foreign law. He seems 
primarily worried about states that use the First Restatement, which can 
recommend foreign law without considering the interests of the relevant 
jurisdictions.
71
 But the fact that a state’s choice-of-law rules are insensitive 
to state (and foreign) interests does not, on its own, implicate any federal 
interests that could justify federal choice-of-law rules.  
Consider Day & Zimmermann, Inc. v. Challoner,
72
 which Childress 
offers as a case where federal choice-of-law rules might be appropriate.
73
 
Day was a product liability suit on behalf of two soldiers—one domiciled in 
Wisconsin and the other in Tennessee—concerning a defective howitzer 
round manufactured in Texas that injured them in Cambodia. The Supreme 
Court held that the federal court in Texas entertaining the actions was 
compelled by Klaxon to use Texas’s First Restatement choice-of-law 
approach. As a result, the federal court probably had to use the law of 
Cambodia, the jurisdiction in which the harm occurred.  
Day is not a case in which federal interests recommend federalizing 
choice of law. To be sure, such interests might justify the creation of a 
substantive federal common law rule. Product liability suits against military 
contractors can discourage them from doing business with the federal 
government. There is a good argument, therefore, for a federal rule 
prohibiting or limiting such actions. This substantive rule would preempt all 
competing law—state and foreign—in a suit against a military contractor.
74
 
But that is not Childress’s argument. He argues instead that federal interests 
recommend a federal choice-of-law rule—which in Day would choose 
 
in which an American court is determining which of two states’ laws ought to apply, because a foreign 
nation might be offended by the application of one of the state’s laws to its domiciliary or to an event 
within its borders. 
70 Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 436–37. 
71 Childress, supra note 1, at 1546–49. 
72 423 U.S. 3 (1975) (link). 
73 Childress, supra note 1, at 1548–49, 1565, 1569–79. 
74 Indeed, later the Supreme Court came to such a conclusion. See Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 
U.S. 500, 512–13 (1988) (link). 
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Texas, Wisconsin, or Tennessee law—rather than Cambodian law.
75
  
It is unclear why federal interests would recommend such a rule. The 
reason cannot be that Cambodia would be offended by the federal court’s 
choice-of-law decision, for that would happen only when Cambodian law 
was not chosen. Granted, if the United States had already adopted a policy 
of retaliating against Cambodia for the failure of its courts to apply 
American law, federal foreign policy interests would recommend that 
American courts apply state law. But it is hard to see how even that unusual 
scenario would apply in Day. Any retaliatory policy directed against the 
Cambodian government would have been a waste of time—at the time Day 
was decided Cambodia was being overrun by the Khmer Rouge.  
The other possible federal interests, as we have seen, are the negative 
consequences of frequent dismissals on forum non conveniens grounds. 
Hamstrung by Klaxon into applying Cambodian law, the federal court 
might refuse to take jurisdiction of the case. As we have seen, however, 
there is a more restrained solution to the problem than a federal choice-of-
law rule—namely, a federal rule discouraging dismissal. 
In his article, Childress has a tendency to endorse—under the guise of 
vindicating federal foreign policy interests—a federal choice-of-law rule 
that is sensitive to state interests.
76
 He does not explain, however, why 
insensitivity to state interests harms the federal government. For this reason, 
he has given us little reason to believe that federal preemption of state 
choice-of-law rules would occur with any regularity.  
It is possible, however, that Professor Childress is not really 
recommending that a uniform federal choice-of-law rule be used for all 
international cases. Although he thinks international choice of law should 
be federalized, he sometimes suggests that the forum state’s choice-of-law 
rules—including the rules of First Restatement states—will usually be 
incorporated into this federal law. The forum state’s rules will be used, “not 
because of compulsion under Erie and Klaxon but because so doing does 
not thwart federal objectives.”
77
  
Under this reading, Childress is not recommending a wholesale change 
in the choice-of-law rules used in international cases. His point is instead 
that the rules that are used should be reconceptualized. State rules will be 
used, in both state and federal courts, only because they have been 
incorporated into federal common law. 
The incorporation of state law into federal common law is a frequent 
 
75 Childress, supra note 1, at 1569–79. 
76 Id. at 1574, 1576. 
77 Id. at 1574. That Childress is speaking of state choice-of-law rules being incorporated into federal 
common law in this passage is strongly suggested by his citation of Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 
500 U.S. 90 (1991) (link) and Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001). 
Incorporation into federal common law occurred in both cases. Childress, supra note 1, at 1574 n.319. 




 For example, because state laws are drafted with an eye to 
local conditions, federal courts sometimes incorporate state standards into 
federal law because doing so allows the content of the federal law to adapt 
to conditions in the state.
79
 Using state standards can also avoid the 
confusion that an independent federal standard would produce among 
citizens who are accustomed to their state’s laws.
80
 State standards can even 
be used for the simple reason that, being relatively well-developed, 
borrowing them allows federal courts to avoid the difficult and uncertain 
work of articulating a uniform federal rule for the first time.
81
  
But Childress does not explain why state choice-of-law rules should be 
incorporated into federal common law. As he describes it, state rules should 
be used when “so doing does not thwart federal objectives.”
82
 This is 
insufficient to justify incorporation. State law standards are not 
incorporated into federal common law when their use does not thwart 
federal objectives. They are incorporated when their use furthers federal 
objectives. Consider a federal court that borrows state standards for a 
federal law because state standards were drafted with an eye to local 
conditions. This is rightly described as incorporation because using state 
standards serves the interests standing behind the federal law, by allowing 
the law to adapt to local conditions.
83
 In contrast, consider Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins.
84
 Although using Pennsylvania law did not frustrate 
federal interests, Erie was not a case in which state law was incorporated 
into federal common law. The reason is that using Pennsylvania law did not 
further federal interests. Indeed, the notion that state law is incorporated 
into federal common law whenever the use of state standards does not 
frustrate federal interests threatens the very idea that state law ever applies 
of its own force.
85
  
My point is not that the distinction between state law being 
incorporated into federal law and applying of its own force is suspect.
86
 
There is a meaningful difference between the two. If state law applies of its 
own force, the authority on the state law standard is the state’s supreme 
court. In contrast, if federal law incorporates state standards, federal 
courts—in particular the United States Supreme Court—are the authority on 
 
78 For a discussion see Green, supra note 7, at 1281–85; Field, supra note 7, at 958–60; Paul J. 
Mishkin, The Variousness of “Federal Law”: Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National and 
State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L. REV. 797, 808–10 (1957). 
79 See Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver Cnty., 328 U.S. 204, 208–09 (1946) (link). 
80 See Kamen, 500 U.S. at 98–99; DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580–82 (1956) (link).  
81 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979) (“[T]he readymade body of state 
law” is adopted “as the federal rule of decision.”) (link). 
82 Childress, supra note 1, at 1574.  
83 See Reconstruction Fin. Corp., 328 U.S. at 208–09. 
84 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
85 See Green, supra note 7, at 1282–83; Field, supra note 7, at 973–77. 
86 For a discussion of such skepticism, see Green, supra note 7, at 1282. 





It is precisely for this reason that Childress’s reconceptualization of 
international choice of law would be so disruptive. Assume, for example, 
that an international choice-of-law case is brought in state court in New 
York. If New York’s choice-of-law rules were really incorporated into 
federal common law, the New York court would be bound by how the 
United States Supreme Court had interpreted New York’s rules. To refuse 
to respect these interpretations would be a violation of its obligation under 
the Supremacy Clause. The New York court could diverge from past 
Supreme Court interpretations only if it thought the Supreme Court would 
follow any new interpretation it adopted.
88
  
Fortunately, such absurd consequences can be avoided by insisting that 
state choice-of-law rules are incorporated into federal common law only 
when their use furthers federal interests. And—to repeat—Childress has not 
provided us with evidence that this occurs in a significant number of cases. 
The title of Childress’s article suggests that he seeks to reevaluate 
whether the disparate set of principles that are commonly called “the Erie 
doctrine” apply in international cases. As it turns out, his real focus is 
narrower: whether Klaxon is binding on a federal court when choosing 
between state law and the law of another nation. Although most of his 
arguments fail to cast doubt on Klaxon in such cases, one argument based 
on the example of Sabbatino does meet its mark. When a state’s choice-of-
law approach would frustrate federal foreign policy interests, preemption by 
a federal common law choice-of-law rule is appropriate. What is missing in 
Childress’s article is a reason to think that federal preemption would occur 
beyond a narrow set of cases like Sabbatino. 
 
87 See Green, supra note 7, at 1281–82; Field, supra note 7, at 964; Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of 
Erie—and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 405–22 (1964). I emphasize the 
United States Supreme Court because of uncertainty concerning whether state courts have a duty to 
abide by lower federal courts’ interpretations of federal law. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 376 
(1993) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, 
but neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires that a state court’s 
interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) federal court’s interpretation.”) (link); Anthony J. 
Bellia Jr., State Courts and the Making of Federal Common Law, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 825, 839 (2005) 
(link).  
88 Of course, Childress might be arguing that the international choice of law is federalized in federal 
court only. See supra note 44. If so, then it would be trivially true that any use of the forum state’s 
choice-of-law rules would be due to incorporation into federal common law, since the forum state’s 
rules cannot legitimately extend to federal courts. See supra note 60 and accompanying text. But under 
such a reading, the analogy Childress draws with Sabbatino would be lost. Furthermore, incorporation 
would be true in all choice-of-law cases faced by federal courts in diversity—including cases where the 
federal court chooses between two states’ laws. Childress would no longer be able to claim that 
international choice of law is distinctive. 
